In the past 12 months, Russia has increasingly actively used GPS jammer to destroy GPS signals and weakened people’s confidence in the “gift from the United States to the world”. These activities seem to meet some of Russia’s national goals:
Western military and peacekeeping operations have suffered setbacks. Russian intervention and deception often hinder attempts to use drones to monitor Ukraine’s Minsk Agreement. Russia’s electronic warfare in Syria has been described as the most powerful war in world history and has hindered the actions of the United States and allied forces.
Protect high-value assets from drones and other surveillance systems and GPS intrusions. In the Black Sea and Baltic regions of Moscow, large-scale deception of GPS signals is seen as part of the Russian drone defense strategy. Most drones are programmed in factories based on the location of the airport and can fly near the airport. So far, because Russia’s GPS spoofing work has caused receivers to report that they are at the airport, it is speculated that this is part of an effort to stop nearby drones (high-security areas).
Encourage the adoption and use of GLONASS instead of GPS, especially near Russia. As we all know, Vladimir Putin criticized GLONASS for being far behind GPS and rarely used. Coastal maritime traffic near Russia is particularly vulnerable to GPS interruptions. Recently, President Putin listened to a briefing on adding differentiated GLONASS services to Russian airports and seaports. Today, more than 8,700 ships in Russian waters are equipped with GLONASS. The Russian GPS jammer can completely destroy the GPS without affecting the GLONASS signal.
Threatening Russia’s neighbors while making them question the relationship with the United States and American technology and rely on the United States and American technology. In September 2017, Russian military exercises interrupted GPS services in northern Norway for a week. In the second half of the same month, Russian GPS jammed the Baltic Sea, disrupting mobile phone services in parts of Latvia, Sweden and Norway. In March 2018, Russia’s intervention during the “exercise” once again disrupted the aviation industry in northern Norway, which also affected the telecommunications industry. The Russian army has many locations in its hinterland and deep in Syria, where GPS interference will not endanger the lives of neighboring countries. The fact that they like to do this shows that their goals are clear.